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1. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1060–61 (2007).
2. Id. at 1061.
3. Id. at 1060–61.
4. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 841 (Or. Ct. App. 2002), vacated, Philip
Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, 540 U.S. 801 (2003).




9. See Philip Morris, 540 U.S. at 801 (granting certiorari). The Supreme Court remanded
the case in light of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
Id. State Farm invalidated a $145-million punitive damages award as excessive under the Due
Process Clause.  State Farm, 538 U.S. at 429. 
10. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1061.
11. Id. at 1062.
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DISTILLING MINIMUM DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS
Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007)
Benjamin J. Robinson*
An Oregon jury found that Jesse Williams, a long time consumer of
Petitioner’s Marlboro cigarettes, died because he consumed those
cigarettes.  The jury was convinced that Williams consumed Petitioner’s1
cigarettes because he believed they were safe to use, and that Petitioner
knowingly and falsely led Williams to believe that its cigarettes were safe
to consume.  As a consequence, the jury awarded Respondent, Williams’2
widow and personal representative, compensatory damages  and imposed3
punitive damages of $79.5 million—roughly equivalent to Petitioner’s
profits during any two-and-a-half-week period for the year in which the
judgment was awarded.  The trial judge found the punitive damages award4
excessive and reduced it by approximately sixty percent.  Petitioner and5
Respondent appealed.  An Oregon Court of Appeals restored the jury’s6
punitive damages award  and the Oregon Supreme Court denied Petitioner7
further review.  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and8
remanded the case in light of its recent punitive damages jurisprudence. 9
The Oregon Court of Appeals once again upheld the jury’s punitive
damages award, and Petitioner sought review in the Oregon Supreme
Court.  That court granted review and held that the punitive damages10
award was not grossly excessive in light of Petitioner’s reprehensible
conduct.  The United States Supreme Court again granted certiorari and,11
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12. Id. at 1060, 1062. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Supreme Court
summarized the factors a court will generally consider when determining whether a liberty or
property deprivation was unconstitutionally effected:
[D]ue process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the
private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.
Id. at 335.
13. See generally 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES §§ 2.0–2.2 (5th ed. 2005)
(addressing the nature and purposes of punitive damages).
14. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1068 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The purpose of punitive
damages . . . is not to compensate, but to punish.”); see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 568 (1996); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991) (“[P]unitive damages
are imposed for purposes of retribution and deterrence.”); SCHLUETER, supra note 13, at 29.
15. SCHLUETER, supra note 13, at 34.
16. 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007). 
17. The Supreme Court commented on the propriety of punitive damages as far back as 1851.
Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851) (acknowledging more than one hundred
years of punitive damages awards and concluding that “a jury may inflict . . . exemplary, punitive,
or vindictive damages upon a defendant, having in view the enormity of his offence rather than the
measure of compensation to the plaintiff”). Yet, the Court has more recently constrained punitive
damages awards under the principles of procedural due process, substantive due process, the
dormant commerce clause, and horizontal federalism. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (holding that there are substantive due process limitations on
punitive damages awards that proscribe “grossly excessive” and “arbitrary” punishment); Cooper
Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001) (holding that appellate
courts must review the constitutional propriety of punitive damage awards de novo); BMW, 517
U.S. at 568 (holding that the Constitution prohibits grossly excessive punishment of tortfeasors);
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 434–35 (1994) (holding that due process requires judicial
review of punitive damages awards); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443,
453–54 (1993) (announcing that the Due Process Clause “imposes substantive limits ‘beyond which
penalties may not go’”) (quoting Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78 (1907));
in vacating and remanding the case, HELD that a punitive damages award
based in part upon the desire to punish a defendant for harming persons
not before the court amounts to a taking of property from the defendant
without due process of law.12
Punitive damages awards serve three primary functions.  They13
(1) punish a defendant’s wrongdoing; (2) deter the defendant and others
from similar misconduct;  and (3) aid in recovering litigation expenses.14 15
Philip Morris USA v. Williams  is the latest in a series of recent cases in16
which the Supreme Court has confronted whether and to what extent the
Constitution imposes procedural requirements and substantive limits on
punitive damages awards.17
2
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Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23 n.11 (noting that the Due Process Clause imposes both a procedural and a
substantive limit on the size of punitive damages awards).
18. 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
19. The Oregon Constitution prohibited review of the punitive damages amount awarded by




22. Id. The jury awarded $919,390.39 in compensatory damages. Id. The compensatory
damages were reduced by 20%, to $735,512.31, because the plaintiff’s own negligent conduct
contributed to the accident. Id.
23. Id.
24. Honda Motor, 512 U.S. at 415.
25. Id. The standard for post-verdict review applied by the Oregon Supreme Court required
that:
A jury’s award of punitive damages shall not be disturbed when it is within the
range that a rational juror would be entitled to award in the light of the record as
a whole; the range that a rational juror would be entitled to award depends, in
turn, on the statutory and common law factors that allow an award of punitive
damages for the specific kind of claim at issue.
Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 888 P.2d 8, 10 (1995). An amendment to the Oregon Constitution
prohibited judicial review of an amount of punitive damages awarded by a jury “unless the court
can affirmatively say there is no evidence to support the verdict.” Honda Motor, 512 U.S. at 427
n.5 (quoting OR. CONST. art. VII, § 3).
26. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 510 U.S. 1068 (1994).
27. Honda Motor, 512 U.S. at 418. The Court granted review specifically to consider whether
Oregon’s limited judicial review complied with the Court’s decision in Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
Id. at 420. The defendant relied on Haslip before the Oregon Court of Appeals and argued that the
punitive damages award violated due process because the award was excessive and because Oregon
In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,  the Court considered whether a state18
could prohibit judicial review of the size of a punitive damages award.19
The defendant had manufactured and sold an all-terrain vehicle that
overturned and severely injured the plaintiff.  The plaintiff sued alleging20
that the manufacturer knew or should have known that the vehicle’s design
was unreasonably dangerous.  The jury found the defendant liable and21
awarded the plaintiff nearly $1 million in compensatory damages  and22
punitive damages of $5 million.  The defendant appealed, arguing that the23
punitive damages award violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because the amount was excessive and because the state court
lacked the power to review excessive verdicts.  Both an Oregon court of24
appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the $5-million award.  The25
Supreme Court granted certiorari  and held that a state cannot deny26
judicial review of the size of a punitive damages award in a manner
inconsistent with the common law without violating the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  Significantly, before addressing the27
3
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courts lacked the power to correct excessive verdicts. Id. at 418.
28. The Honda majority noted that its “recent cases have recognized that the Constitution
imposes a substantive limit on the size of punitive damages awards . . . [a]lthough they fail to ‘draw
a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally
unacceptable.’” Id. at 420 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458
(1993)).
29. Id. at 430.
30. Honda Motor, 512 U.S. at 429.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 432.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 432 n.10 (indicating that a proper standard might be akin to the standard that
procedural due process issue, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority of
the Court, endorsed the use of substantive due process for the judicial
review of punitive damages awards.  28
The Court reasoned that Oregon’s abrogation of a well-established
common law protection against arbitrary deprivations of property
presumptively violated procedural due process.  The Court observed that29
an Oregon court could only overturn a punitive damages award if it could
not find any substantial evidence to support any punitive damages award.
While Oregon law ensured that punitive damages would not be awarded
against defendants entirely innocent of conduct warranting exemplary
damages, the Court said that the Oregon procedure provided no assurance
that those whose conduct is sanctionable will be protected from punitive
damages of arbitrary amounts.  The Court also reasoned that “evidence30
of culpability warranting some punishment is not a substitute for evidence
providing at least a rational basis for the particular deprivation of property
imposed by the State to deter future wrongdoing.”  The Court recognized31
that a jury’s power to award punitive damages poses an acute danger of the
arbitrary deprivation of property and furthermore, that Oregon removed a
judicial safeguard against such risk without providing an adequate
substitute procedure.  By restricting the ability of the judiciary to review32
the size of punitive damage awards, the Supreme Court concluded that the
Oregon Constitution violated a defendant’s right to due process.33
Yet, the ruling in Honda Motor was not based merely on the
presumption of unconstitutionality that arose from Oregon’s procedural
defects. Justice Stevens explained that jury discretion regarding the
amount of punitive damages created a danger that defendants would be
arbitrarily deprived of property through excessive jury awards.  However,34
the majority opinion did not set forth standards for determining when a
punitive damages award was so excessive that it violated substantive due
process even if the trial and appellate courts had provided the defendant
with fair procedures.35
4
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the Court used to determine whether there was a sufficient factual basis to justify a finding of guilt
in a criminal case). Significantly, the Court also rejected a contention that an adoption of a statutory
clear-and-convincing standard for an award of punitive damages was adequate because the adoption
of such a standard did not provide any assurance that those whose conduct was sanctionable by
punitive damages would not be subjected to punitive damages for arbitrary amounts. Id. at 433.
Finally, the Court rejected a contention that proper jury instructions provided an adequate safeguard
because of the risk that juries may choose not to follow such instructions and thereafter render
lawless, biased, or arbitrary verdicts. Id. at 433 & n.11. Hence, in the absence of an available
review of the size of the punitive damage award, the Court ruled that the defendant had been denied
due process of law. See supra text accompanying note 31.
36. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
37. Id. at 585–86.
38. Id. at 563. The jury found that the defendant did not disclose the repair. Id. at 579–80.
39. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 629 (Ala. 1994). The Supreme Court of
Alabama found the jury’s award of $4 million excessive and reduced it to $2 million. Id.
40. BMW, 517 U.S. at 585–86. But see TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S.
443, 451–53 (1993) (upholding a $10-million punitive damages award where plaintiff recovered
$19,000 in compensatory damages).
41. BMW, 517 U.S. at 572–73. The Court reasoned that while punitive damages may properly
be imposed to further a state’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its
repetition within its jurisdiction, the principles of state sovereignty and comity preclude imposing
punitive damages for extraterritorial conduct that does not affect its consumers. Id. at 572. It said
that while each state has the power to protect its own consumers, none may use the deterrent of
punitive damages as a means of imposing its regulatory policies on an entire nation. Id. at 585.
42. Id. at 568–69.
Only two years later, in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,  the36
Court for the first time reversed an award of punitive damages on the
grounds that it was unconstitutionally excessive under the Due Process
Clause.  In Gore, the plaintiff purchased an automobile that defendant37
misrepresented as new, when in fact the vehicle had been damaged and
repaired prior to its sale.  The plaintiff prevailed at trial, and the Alabama38
Supreme Court imposed a $2-million punitive damages award.  The39
Supreme Court reversed, holding that although a state may impose
punitive damages to deter unlawful conduct, the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause prohibits states from imposing grossly excessive
punishments on tortfeasors.  Additionally, the Court held that a state40
cannot allow recovery of punitive damages sought to either deter future
conduct in another state where such conduct is lawful, or to recover for
past conduct in another state when such conduct did not have an impact
upon the forum state.41
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens first addressed the scope of
harmful conduct that a state may legitimately seek to punish through
punitive damages.  According to the Court, the jury in BMW had42
improperly calculated the punitive damages award on the basis of harm to
every purchaser nationwide whom BMW failed to inform of the pre-sale
5
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43. Id. at 573; see also, Laura J. Hines, Due Process Limitations on Punitive Damages: Why
State Farm Won’t Be the Last Word, 37 AKRON L. REV. 779, 785 (2004) (“The Court left for
another day, however, the question of whether a state may base a punitive damages award on
unlawful conduct in other states.”). Significantly, the nondisclosure of manufacturer repainting was
expressly lawful in many states. Id. at 785.
44. BMW, 517 U.S. at 574–75. Justice Scalia dissented, criticizing what he regarded as the
illegitimate federalization of “yet another aspect of our Nation’s legal culture (no matter how much
in need of correction it may be).” BMW, 517 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Hines,
supra note 43, at 782–89 (discussing the Supreme Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence before
State Farm). Justice Scalia observed that the Due Process Clause only guarantees “an opportunity
to contest the reasonableness of a damages judgment in state court; but there is no federal guarantee
a damages award actually be reasonable.” BMW, 517 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Ginsburg also dissented, arguing that the Court “unnecessarily and unwisely ventures [further] into
territory traditionally within the States’ domain.” Id. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 575 (suggesting that the degree of reprehensibility is “[p]erhaps the most important
indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award”).
46. Id. at 580.
47. Id. at 575. The Court reasoned that under judicial precedent, it was more appropriate to
apply such a standard than to draw a bright line based upon a ratio between compensatory and
punitive damages. Id. at 582–83, 585.
48. Id. at 585–86.
49. Id. at 576, 580.
50. BMW, 517 U.S. at 583 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443,
481 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
51. Id. at 584.
repainting.  BMW established three “guideposts” to determine whether43
punitive damages awards are grossly excessive and therefore violate due
process.  First, a court must consider the degree of reprehensibility of the44
defendant’s misconduct.  Second, a court must evaluate the disparity45
between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the
punitive damages award.  Third, a court must reconcile the difference46
between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties
authorized or imposed in comparable cases.47
Applying these guideposts, the Court invalidated the punitive damages
award under review.  The defendant’s misconduct—failing to inform a48
customer that the new car he purchased had been repainted—was
dismissed as “purely economic” and “not sufficiently reprehensible to
warrant imposition of a $2 million exemplary damages award.”49
Regarding the relationship between the punitive award and the harm
inflicted on the plaintiff, the Court concluded that the 500:1 ratio was
“breathtaking” and “‘raise[d] a suspicious judicial eyebrow’” placing the
award beyond the acceptable range.  Finally, the Court noted that the50
maximum civil penalty for the defendant’s misconduct in Alabama, the
plaintiff’s home state, would have been $2,000, with other states
authorizing up to $10,000.  Such an amount was clearly less than the51
$2-million punitive award imposed by the Alabama jury, was grossly
6
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52. Id. at 586; see also A. Benjamin Spencer, Due Process and Punitive Damages: The Error
of Federal Excessiveness Jurisprudence, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1085, 1096–99 (2006) (reviewing the
raised-eyebrow test, among others). 
53. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
54. Id. at 429. 
55. Id. at 413–14.
56. Id. at 415. The jury also awarded $2.6 million in compensatory damages. Id. The trial
court reduced the compensatory damages to $1 million. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 416, 418. In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424
(2001), the Supreme Court held that an appellate court must review, de novo, a trial court’s
application of the BMW guideposts. Id. at 431. Justice Ginsburg, however, advocated applying an
abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 444 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In State Farm, the Court
reaffirmed Cooper’s mandate of de novo review to ensure that punitive damages awards were based
on law and not the decision-maker’s caprice. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418.
59. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419–20. The Court asserted that BMW’s reprehensibility
guidepost required courts to consider five factors, including whether:
[T]he harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct
evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others;
the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated
actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional
malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.
Id. (citing BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576–77 (1996)).
60. See id. at 422 (“Lawful out-of-state conduct may be probative when it demonstrates the
deliberateness and culpability of the defendant’s action in the State where it is tortious, but that
excessive, and “transcend[ed] the constitutional limit.”  52
Any unwillingness to advocate a tolerable ratio of compensatory to
punitive damages quickly faded when the Court considered State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell.  In State Farm, the Court53
again invalidated a punitive damages award as excessive under the Due
Process Clause.  The plaintiffs sued the defendant for bad-faith failure to54
settle an insurance claim within policy limits.  A jury awarded $14555
million in punitive damages, but the trial court reduced that award to $25
million.  The Utah Supreme Court applied BMW’s three guideposts and56
reinstated the jury’s punitive damages award.  The U.S. Supreme Court57
granted certiorari, believing it neither close nor difficult that a
$145-million punitive damages award was excessive under each of BMW’s
guideposts.  58
Under the first guidepost, the Court said there was some
reprehensibility associated with the defendant’s refusal to settle a
third-party claim where the liability appeared to be clear and the damages
exceeded the plaintiffs’ policy limits.  The Court reasoned, however, that59
the lower court erred in accepting extensive evidence of misconduct that
lacked a nexus to the insured’s third-party claim.  Expanding on the60
7
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conduct must have a nexus to the specific harm suffered by the plaintiff.”).
61. Id. The Court emphasized as fundamental principles of federalism that each state may
determine what conduct is permitted and proscribed within its borders and what measure of
punishment, if any, to impose on wrongdoers within its jurisdiction. Id. 
62. Id. at 421.
63. First, the Court reasoned that such conduct might reveal the deliberateness and culpability
of a defendant’s actions. Id. at 422. Second, prior misconduct, whether inside or out of the court’s
jurisdiction, may be relevant because a recidivist may be punished more harshly than a first
offender, if the conduct in question is similar to prior transgressions. Id. at 423.
64. Id. at 422.
65. Id. at 424–25.
66. See id. at 425 (“Single-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due process,
while still achieving the State’s goals of deterrence and retribution, than awards with ratios in range
of 500 to 1 . . . .”).
67. Id. at 425, 429. The Court reasoned that this conclusion was especially true in a case
where compensatory damages are substantial. Id. at 429. Because the punitive damage award in the
instant case was excessive, the lower court was instructed to determine the proper amount of
punitive damages on remand. Id.
68. Id. at 425. The Court pointed to a “long legislative history, dating back over 700 years
. . . providing for sanctions of double, treble, or quadruple damages to deter and punish.” Id.
federalism and procedural due process concerns it raised in BMW, the
Court held that the state had impermissibly infringed upon the sovereignty
of its sister states by punishing the defendant for conduct that occurred
outside its jurisdiction.  Regardless of whether other states would regard61
the defendant’s conduct as lawful or unlawful, the Court ruled that no state
has a legitimate interest in punishing conduct outside its borders.  Yet, the62
Court acknowledged that its prior cases established that a plaintiff could
introduce out-of-state conduct to demonstrate the relative reprehensibility
of a defendant’s in-state conduct.  It concluded, however, that the punitive63
damages award upheld by the Utah Supreme Court violated due process
because it punished the defendant for conduct “independent from the acts
upon which liability was premised . . . .”  Thus, the Court signaled that64
any assessment of reprehensibility under the BMW guidepost must be
limited to the conduct that caused harm to the plaintiff.
The Court considered BMW’s second excessiveness guidepost—the
disparity between harm and the damages—and again refused to impose a
bright-line ratio of punitive to compensatory damages.  However, the65
Court suggested that reviewing courts apply a significantly narrowed range
for assessing the excessiveness of a punitive damages award.  The Court66
rejected State Farm’s 145:1 ratio as excessive  and discussed a host of67
factors justifying ratios of 1:1 or 4:1, before concluding that “few awards
exceeding a single-digit ratio” between punitive and compensatory
damages will satisfy due process.  The Court briefly considered the third68
guidepost, and concluded that in light of the $2.6 million in compensatory
damages awarded to the plaintiffs, a punitive award near the amount of
8
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69. Id. at 428–29. The Court evaluated the difference between the punitive damages awarded
by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. Id. at 428. The Court
noted that the most relevant civil sanction under Utah state law appeared to be a $10,000 fine for
an act of fraud. Id.
70. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1060 (2007).
71. Id. at 1062 (citing BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996)).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing BMW, 517 U.S. at 574).
75. Id. (citing BMW, 517 U.S. at 571–72).
76. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1062. The Philip Morris Court considered only whether
Oregon had unconstitutionally permitted the Petitioner to be punished for harming nonparty victims
and avoided the question whether the punitive damages award was “grossly excessive” and
therefore constitutionally defective. Id. 
77. Id. at 1063.
78. Id.
79. Id. The Philip Morris Court reasoned that allowing a jury to punish a defendant for harm
compensatory damages was appropriate.69
In vacating the Oregon Supreme Court’s judgment, the Philip Morris
Court again signaled its reluctance to articulate a concrete constitutional
limit on the ratio between harm to the plaintiff and the punitive damages
award. Instead, the Philip Morris Court focused on a threshold procedural
due process requirement to invalidate a jury award based partly on a jury’s
desire to punish the defendant for harming nonparties.  The Philip Morris70
Court reiterated BMW’s reasoning that states may impose punitive
damages to further their legitimate interests in punishing and deterring
unlawful conduct.  Yet those interests, the Philip Morris Court reasoned,71
could not be accomplished by assessing arbitrary punishments.  Arbitrary72
punishments are avoided when states insist on standards that delineate the
jury’s discretionary authority.  Without those proper standards, states’73
punitive damages systems compromise State Farm’s assurance of fair
notice concerning the severity of a penalty a state may impose.74
Further, the Philip Morris Court found that where punitive damages
amounts are significant, a punitive damages system that lacks proper
standards may impose the public policy preferences of one state—or one
jury—upon sister states with different policies.  Thus, as in Honda, the75
Philip Morris Court found that the Constitution imposes limits on both the
procedures related to punitive damages awards and on grossly excessive
amounts.  The Philip Morris Court’s inquiry focused on Oregon’s76
procedural defects.77
For three reasons, the Philip Morris Court held that the Due Process
Clause forbids a state from using a punitive damages award to punish a
defendant for harm inflicted on “strangers” to the litigation.  First, a78
defendant threatened with punishment for injury inflicted upon strangers
has no opportunity to defend against the charge.  Second, permitting such79
9
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to nonparties was said to deprive such defendant of its right “‘to present every available defense’”
to the claims at issue. Id. (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972)). 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063–65.




87. Id. at 1064–65.
88. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1064.
89. Id. at 1064–65.
90. Id. The Court then explicitly held that a jury may not punish for harm to others. Id. at
1065.
91. Id.
punishment would add a “near standardless dimension to the punitive
damages equation” and would magnify the fundamental due process
concerns—namely arbitrariness, uncertainty, and lack of notice—that the
Court has wrestled with throughout its punitive damages jurisprudence.80
Third, the Philip Morris Court found no authority to support the use of
punitive damages awards to punish a defendant for harming others.81
The Court, however, sympathized with Respondent’s argument that
demonstrating harm to others is relevant to reprehensibility.  The Court82
observed that evidence of actual harm to nonparties can help show that the
conduct that harmed a plaintiff posed additional, substantial risk to the
general public and was, therefore, particularly reprehensible.  However,83
the Court noted that a jury must not take the additional leap forward to use
a punitive damages award to punish a defendant directly for harms to the
nonparty public.  Because imprecise procedure risks unfairness, the Court84
found it constitutionally important for a court to ensure that each jury is
“ask[ing] the right question.”  Similarly, because of the risks of85
arbitrariness, inadequate notice, and imposing one state’s policies on other
states, the Court found it particularly important that states avoid
procedures that unnecessarily deprive juries of proper legal guidance.86
The Philip Morris Court then examined the Oregon Supreme Court’s
opinion.  It observed that Oregon focused on more than the defendant’s87
reprehensible conduct.  In particular, the Court focused on three88
statements the state’s high court made in rejecting Petitioner’s claim that
the Constitution prohibits using punitive damages to punish a defendant
for harm to nonparties.  First, the Court noted that the state supreme court89
correctly concluded that State Farm held that only a jury could not base an
award on dissimilar acts of a defendant.  Second, the Court criticized the90
Oregon Supreme Court’s conclusion that if a jury cannot punish for the
reprehensible conduct, there could be no reason to consider such conduct.91
Instead, the Court reasoned that the Due Process Clause prohibits a state
10
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92. Id. As discussed, infra, this passage alone may keep due process scholars occupied for
years. 
93. Id. The Court remarked that this question raises the practical problem of knowing whether
a jury punished a defendant for causing injury to others or simply considered such injury during its
reprehensibility analysis. Id.
94. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1065. 
95. Id. Because the Oregon Supreme Court’s application of the Philip Morris Court’s
standards could result in a significant change in the level of the punitive damages award, the Court
did not consider whether the vacated award was constitutionally “grossly excessive.” Id.; see also
BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996) (noting that while a state may impose punitive
damages to further its interest in deterring unlawful conduct, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause prohibits states from imposing grossly excessive punishments on tortfeasors). 
96. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996).
97. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 418 (1994).
98. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also authored
the majority opinion in Cooper Industries and TXO (where a majority of Justices, in separate
opinions, endorsed the use of substantive and procedural due process principles to limit punitive
damages awards). Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 426 (2001);
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 446 (1993). In TXO, Justice Stevens wrote
that “‘grossly excessive’” punitive damages awards amounted to “‘a deprivation of property
without due process of law.’” TXO, 509 U.S. at 454 (quoting Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212
U.S. 86, 111 (1909)).
99. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1065 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 1066–67.
101. Id. at 1067 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell,
538 U.S. 408, 429–30 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Cooper, 532 U.S. at 443 (Thomas, J.,
from inflicting punishment for harm to nonparties, but permits a jury to
consider such harm in determining reprehensibility.  Finally, the Court92
considered whether a jury could consider harm to nonparties and
nevertheless withhold that consideration from the “punishment calculus.”93
The Court said that “state courts cannot authorize procedures that create
an unreasonable and unnecessary risk of any such confusion occurring”
when juries factor nonparty harm in the punishment calculus.  The Court94
concluded that while substantial procedural flexibility exists for states to
determine what kind of procedures to implement to protect against that
risk, federal constitutional law obligates the states to provide some form
of protection where the risk of misunderstanding is significant.95
Justice Stevens, who had written for the Court in both BMW  and96
Honda,  dissented.  He reiterated the importance of substantive and97 98
procedural constraints on states’s power to impose punitive damages,  but99
strongly criticized the majority’s effort to distinguish between: (1) taking
third-party harm into account for assessing the reprehensibility of the
defendant’s conduct, which the majority permitted; and (2) assessing third-
party harm in order to punish the defendant directly, which the majority
proscribed.100
In his dissent, Justice Thomas argued that the Constitution does not
limit the size of punitive damages awards.  Justice Thomas criticized  the101
11
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concurring). 
102. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1067–68 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
103. Id. at 1068 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg argued that the Oregon courts
endeavored to follow the Supreme Court’s decisions and had not deprived the jury of proper legal
guidance. Id. 
104. Id. Justice Ginsburg did recognize Respondent’s valid objection to the trial court’s refusal
to give one requested charge. Id. at 1068–69. Justice Ginsburg then analyzed the proposed
instruction before concluding that any judge seeking to “enlighten rather than confuse” would resist
such a proposed charge. Id. at 1069.
105. Id. 
106. Perhaps the broadest recurring question the Philip Morris decision raises is what
deference the Supreme Court owes state legislatures and state courts as branches of a coordinate
sovereign. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 1.5 (5th ed. 2007)
(discussing comity as a central theme in the law and study of federal jurisdiction).
107. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063.
108. For a general introduction to how this process operates and how the question of punitive
damages is presented to a jury, see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW
JURIES DECIDE 6–16 (2002).
109. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1069 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
classification of the Philip Morris holding as procedural, arguing that the
majority instead expands the Court’s “substantive due process regime” and
shows again that the Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence is
“‘insusceptible of principled application.’”102
Justice Ginsburg delivered a third dissent, joined by Justices Scalia and
Thomas, insisting that the Oregon courts’ rulings did not conflict with the
majority’s opinion.  Justice Ginsburg further argued that the Petitioner103
had failed to preserve any objection regarding the charges delivered to the
jury, the evidence introduced at trial, or the Respondent’s closing
argument.  Thus, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the majority ventured104
beyond the bounds of the case as set by the trial court.105
Philip Morris, while important in developing the constitutional law on
punitive damages, left unresolved several important questions.  The case106
is clear in holding that it is unconstitutional for a jury to award punitive
damages to punish a company for harming “strangers to the litigation,”107
but it does not tell courts how to comply with its holding.  Philip Morris108
says little about how trial judges seeking “diligently to adhere to [the
Court’s] changing, less than crystalline precedent” should instruct their
juries to consider a defendant’s harmful conduct to third parties.  And the109
Philip Morris dissents illustrate that it will be difficult to predict how
juries will be able to weigh the evidence of harm to others to determine the
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, without punishing the
defendant for that conduct. If four justices fail to understand this formula,
it may be difficult to find a jury that can understand it. So, how might a
trial court charge its jury through the high-wire act of applying an
12
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110. Id. at 1063–64 (majority opinion).
111. Id. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1069 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(concluding that what the jury must do “slips from my grasp”).
112. That instruction forbids “punish[ing] a defendant directly on account of harms it is
alleged to have visited on nonparties.” Id. at 1064 (majority opinion).
113.  BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996).
114.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 421 (2003).
115.  Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063–64.
116.  BMW, 517 U.S. at 613–14 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
instruction that insists that a jury consider harm to other victims, but
forbids them from punishing a defendant for that harm?  Perhaps Justice110
Stevens expressed the thoughts of scores of trial judges when he concluded
“[t]his nuance eludes me.”111
Trial courts will likely meet Philip Morris’s charge by changing
existing jury instructions,  and then releasing the panel to perform112
whatever mental gymnastics are needed to return a constitutional punitive
damages award. On the other hand, this path may encourage lower courts
to simply say nothing about the function of a punitive judgment. Arguably,
the surest method for a court to avoid review under Philip Morris is to say
nothing more than the punitive award it has imposed is a proper response
to the defendant’s reprehensible conduct toward the victim. Either way, the
practical effect of any additional jury instructions will be de minimis and
the immediate effect will be to muddy the waters until the Court revisits
this issue again.
In BMW, the Court limited to a states’s borders the conduct a state
could constitutionally punish or deter.  Yet, remarkably large punitive113
damages awards persisted. Then, in State Farm, the Court expanded its
holding in BMW by eliminating a state’s ability to deter and punish even
unlawful conduct outside its jurisdiction,  and large punitive damages114
awards still persisted. The Philip Morris Court now prohibits a jury from
punishing reprehensible conduct to people other than the plaintiff, but
nevertheless permits that jury to consider the conduct when it is
sufficiently analogous to the cause of harm suffered by the plaintiff.115
Should we now expect a sea of change in punitive damages recoveries?
Arguably, no. Justice Ginsburg, in her dissenting BMW opinion, rightly
pointed out that it would be impossible for the Supreme Court to review
all state cases in which the defendant sought Supreme Court review on the
basis of an allegedly excessive punitive damages award.  Since BMW and116
State Farm have clearly failed to confine punitive damages awards to the
magical 9:1 ratio, the Supreme Court will need to confront the bounds of
substantive due process before its constitutionalization of punitive
damages can proceed much further.
The decision is similarly significant for its impact on the ability of
13
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117. For a powerful indictment of Philip Morris’ logic, see Comment, Punitive Damages, 121
HARV. L. REV. 275 (2007), which assesses the history and culture of the Fourteenth Amendment
and argues generally that the Court used the Amendment to reaffirm and enrich procedural and
substantive due process protections for corporations sued for punitive damages. See also F. Patrick
Hubbard, Substantive Due Process Limits on Punitive Damages Awards: “Morals Without
Technique”?, 60 FLA. L. REV. 349, 351 (2008) (criticizing the requirement for a jury instruction
that is either incomprensible, or formalistic); see generally Rosalie Berger Levinson, Reigning in
Abuses of Executive Power Through Substantive Due Process, 60 FLA. L. REV. 519, 523 & nn. 12-
13 (2008) (putting punitive damages in the context of due process jurisprudence).
118. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422.
119. Justice Scalia, for example, has argued that the Supreme Court has “no business in this
area, except to assure that due process . . . has been observed.” TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res.
Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 472 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). But see BMW, 517 U.S. at 571 (noting that
a state’s power to award punitive damages may, in an appropriate case be “subordinate to the
federal power over interstate commerce”). Clearly, the Philip Morris majority would assert that
assuring due process had been observed was precisely what the Court considered. Yet, Justice Field
provided a powerfully contrary suggestion, in an effort to make clear the scope of protection
provided by the Due Process Clause: 
If the laws enacted by a state be within the legitimate sphere of legislative power,
and their enforcement be attended with the observance of those general rules
which our system of jurisprudence prescribes for the security of private rights, the
harshness, injustice, and oppressive character of such laws will not invalidate
them as affecting life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 520 (1885).
120. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
states to regulate the conduct at issue. Philip Morris, along with BMW and
State Farm, suggests that the Court will continue to protect large
corporations’ economic substantive due process rights from excessive state
punishment.  However, critics will argue that the states’ objectives and117
expertise deserve greater judicial deference compared to the court’s
treatment of substantive due process issues. In State Farm, the Court
explained that a basic principle of federalism presumes that “each State
may make its own reasoned judgment about what conduct is permitted or
proscribed within its borders, and each State alone can determine what
measure of punishment, if any, to impose on a defendant who acts within
its jurisdiction.”  These “horizontal” federalism concerns play a critical118
role in the BMW and State Farm holdings, yet the Court has largely
ignored the consistent “vertical” federalism objections of Justices Scalia
and Thomas.  Perhaps the extent to which each state may make its own119
reasoned judgment about what conduct is permitted within its borders
shifts depending on the type of federalism invoked.
To be sure, punitive damages are intended to punish.  But Philip120
Morris resurrects the fundamental question of whether punitive damages
exist solely to punish wrongdoing that harms parties before the court. The
14
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121. But see Insurers Hail Supreme Court’s Curtailing of Punitive Damages, INS. J., Feb. 21,
2007, available at http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2007/02/21/77076.htm (arguing
that the Philip Morris decision is important for restraining abusive litigation costs and reducing the
threat of punitive damages as leverage to extract higher settlements).
122. Here, the major debate concerns the intersection of deterrence and the insurability of
punitive damages. Arguably, allowing punitive damages to be insured frustrates the very purpose
of the award and therefore contravenes established public policy. See ROBERT H. JERRY,
UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 576 (3d ed. 2002). 
Court’s holding suggests an affirmative answer. Yet, a historically
significant argument remains that punitive damages should also serve to
deter against future conduct involving other parties. The majority opinion
ignores the deterrent function of punitive damages. Instead of grappling
with deterrence, the Court adopted a theory of procedural due process
under which it is unconstitutional to do precisely what deterrence theory
indicates one should do in the case of a recidivist, infrequently punished
wrongdoer. At the very least, it must be admitted that there is a distinction
between awarding one plaintiff punitive damages because the defendant’s
action actually harmed others and awarding a plaintiff punitive damages
based on the reprehensibility of an action that had the potential to cause
harm to many others. Thus, there should be a distinction between
permitting the Respondent from collecting extraordinary damages on
behalf of all statewide victims (e.g., all of Oregon’s dead smokers) and
permitting those damages based on the additional deaths Petitioner’s
conduct may have inflicted.
A final question is whether permitting a jury to consider harms to
others as part of the reprehensibility analysis, but not as part of the actual
calculation of a punitive judgment, will ultimately provide any tangible
benefit to defendants. Perhaps Philip Morris will prove to be only a slight
jurisprudential addition. The BMW majority, for example, believed that
using its standards would give enough guidance to lower courts so that the
Court should not have to consider many petitions for certiorari where a
case involved only an issue of the excessive amount of punitive damages.
Regardless, there seems to be little practical benefit to corporations.121
First, defendants are already equipped to insure against punitive damages
awards in many states.  Second, lawyers will be able to offer evidence of122
the impact of corporate wrongdoing. Clearly, BMW allows juries to
consider the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct. Although the jury
cannot punish for imposing harm on others, Philip Morris provides that the
jury can consider the actual or potential harm suffered by others in
determining reprehensibility. It will be up to the lower courts to sort out
just how they can do this, and how the jury should weigh the evidence,
consistent with the Supreme Court’s confusing standards.
Philip Morris purports to create a new standard to protect defendants
15
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123. The Court recently answered this question, but only as it pertains to maritime cases. See
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (holding federal statutory law does not bar
a punitive award on top compensatory damages, but limiting such awards to an amount equal to
compensatory damages). The Court specifically declined to consider Exxon’s challenge to the size
of a punitive damages verdict based on due process principles. While the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in a federal maritime case will not bind state court judges, it may prove persuasive.
Nevertheless, Justice Ginsburg again dissented and asked whether the Court would, at the next
opportunity, overule State Farm and hold “definitively, that 1:1 is the ceiling due process requires
in all of the states, and for all federal claims?” Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
from unconstitutional punishment for perceived harm to nonparties. Yet,
the standard is one that even some of the Court’s own members do not
understand. Little, if any, guidance is provided to the lower courts that will
have to implement it. However, Philip Morris illustrates that the Court is
content to tread deeper into fields traditionally tended by the states,
without tilling any meaningful lines to define the boundaries of economic
substantive due process. It is difficult to forecast whether the Supreme
Court would need to continue its active review of state punitive damages
awards in light of Philip Morris. The next case will likely involve a tort
action with no federal issue apart from the size of the damages award.
BMW and State Farm arguably restrict the Court’s substantive due process
approach, if only implicitly. Philip Morris itself seems to place the
capstone on procedural due process defects. Continued scrutiny of state
awards, under the rubric of procedural due process, would waste the
Court’s limited resources and signal a retreat from the Rehnquist Court’s
expansive deference to the states based on federalism principles. Thus, the
remaining choice is whether the Court will invoke substantive due process
concerns to draw a bright line protection for defendants facing large
punitive damages awards. Presumably then, the only question left to
answer will be: “How much is too much?”123
16
Florida Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 8
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol60/iss4/8
